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Memorandum by Iain Wright1 and David Heald2 to the Finance and 
Constitution Committee 
THE IMPACT OF UK COMMON FRAMEWORKS ON THE DEVOLUTION 
SETTLEMENT3  
Introduction 
1. The opportunity is welcomed to submit written evidence to the Finance and 
Constitution Committee Inquiry into the impact of post-Brexit common 
frameworks on the devolution settlement.  
2. Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, EU law will apply to the United 
Kingdom until 29 March 2019, at which point it will be frozen. There are various 
circumstances in which changes to this body of law will be required: 
a) The European Union passes new regulations and directives which apply or 
must be implemented during the transition period 
b) The European Union passes new regulations and directives after the 
transition period with which the United Kingdom must comply in order to 
maintain whatever market access arrangements have been negotiated 
c) The UK Government wishes to change the frozen body of EU law applicable 
to the United Kingdom. 
The Finance and Constitution Committee’s (2018) Call for Evidence notes that 
there are 111 areas of EU law that intersect with the devolved competence of the 
Scottish Parliament.  
3. Before the Brexit Referendum, there were almost no references to the internal 
UK market, protection of which largely came from all parts of the United Kingdom 
being subject to EU law. Post-Brexit, UK common frameworks are intended to 
perform that role. Although not always explicit, there are two issues: 
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a) whether, in particular cases, protection of the internal UK market requires 
harmonisation across the United Kingdom, meaning either uniformity or 
equivalent outcome 
b) whether the UK Government unilaterally determines those common 
frameworks or whether the Devolved Administrations have rights of 
consultation or veto. 
To avoid unnecessary complications in the drafting, this memorandum is written 
on the assumption that there will be a Withdrawal Treaty, that the United Kingdom 
leaves the European Union on 29 March 2019, and that the transition period ends 
on 31 December 2020. However, most points could be developed in relation to 
other scenarios. 
4. The authors of this memorandum are not lawyers but public policy specialists: 
Wright on the energy sector and Heald on public finances. Accordingly, 
observations are restricted to areas of expertise and knowledge. The next section 
provides responses to the four questions posed by the Call for Evidence, then 
two sections discuss the specific areas of energy and public finances. 
Responses to Questions posed by the Call for Evidence 
Question 1: What should replace the current EU policy-making processes 
across the UK?  
5. The political difficulties stem from the lack of trust between the UK Government 
and the Devolved Administrations, as noted by the report by the Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2018). Obstacles to 
consensual policy-making will continue: the constitutional status of Scotland and 
Brexit remain contested issues; there is divergent political control of the UK 
Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales; and there 
has been de facto suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly since 9 January 
2017. All events and developments are interpreted through the lens of political 
calculation in relation to constitutional futures. Viewed from the devolved capitals, 
1999 was a critical juncture in the governance of the United Kingdom. Viewed 
from London, it was marginally inconvenient (the relatively clean separation of 
functions limited spillovers) but not a fundamental challenge to Westminster 
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authority. The notion of ‘partners in the Union’ does not travel well beyond the 
borders of the devolved nations. Moreover, Brexit, which was not anticipated in 
1999, has brought unprecedented conflict between the UK Government and the 
Scottish and Welsh Governments, with the UK Government reasserting its 
primacy. 
6. Moreover, the Brexit decision followed massive cutbacks in Whitehall capacity 
due to post-2010 austerity policy (Freeguard et al., 2018, p. 26). The effects on 
institutional memory have been exacerbated by extensive reconfigurations of 
Whitehall departments and by the unprecedented workload generated by Brexit 
preparations. Brexit negotiations have been further complicated by UK Cabinet 
divisions on ‘type of Brexit’ and by the EU tradition of late-night deals. Seeking 
agreement with politically hostile Devolved Administrations has unsurprisingly 
been a low priority for the UK Government (Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018). 
7. In terms of institutional structures, common frameworks should be developed by 
a process similar to that for creating an EU directive. Although the establishment 
of Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPB) attracts criticism for adding to the 
so-called ‘quango state’, a specific-purpose arm’s length body would be 
appropriate, bringing a standardisation of approach across all UK departments. 
This should be staffed by personnel from across the United Kingdom, some on 
secondment. The detailed drafting of particular elements of the common 
frameworks could be delegated by this body to the functional departments of the 
four governments. This NDPB should lay reports to all four legislatures. It would 
be worthwhile considering the experiences of federal countries such as Australia 
and Canada, though the asymmetric UK devolution might make arrangements 
more difficult to replicate. 
Question 2: Addressing the governance gap in relation to the monitoring, 
implementation and enforcement of frameworks  
8. Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England have each had (varying degrees 
of) legislative divergence, established over a range of timescales. This has 
allowed Scotland to pass legislation on smoking in public places and alcohol 
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limits for drivers that differ from those elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The 
Scottish Government has also chosen not to follow England & Wales on 
privatisation of the water industry and has rolled back commercialisation in the 
Scottish Health Service, while that process has advanced in England. 
9. It is perfectly possible to implement market arrangements that span jurisdictional 
boundaries provided there is political will, even where substantial differences in 
legal frameworks exist. These differences are not likely to be an issue if they 
govern personal behaviour (e.g. drink-driving limits), but they might be 
contentious if they are perceived to constrain government discretion at a UK level 
(e.g. in making third-country trade agreements involving water, health services 
or fisheries).  
10. Sensitive issues relate to the balancing of powers of devolved and central 
governments. The European Union is constrained by only being able to legislate 
in areas where competence has been conferred by the EU Treaties. Moreover, 
EU legislative action is also constrained by the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity; “EU action cannot exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the treaties”, and “in areas where either the EU or national 
governments can act, the EU may intervene only if it can act more effectively” 
(European Commission, undated). In contrast, the constraints on UK 
Government action post-Brexit will be political rather than constitutional. Although 
much attention has been paid to devolution gains in the three smaller nations of 
the United Kingdom, the diminished status and functions of local government, 
particularly in England, have been just as significant.  
11. In the context of creating common frameworks for the post-Brexit world, applying 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity would address some of the 
issues identified in the Scottish Government’s (2016) Scotland’s Place in Europe, 
where issues were identified around powers being defined differently for Scotland 
compared with Northern Ireland, with questions being asked as to the underlying 
principles being used to determine which powers should be available to each 
Administration. The need for a proper governance framework has been identified 
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by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2018) and 
Paun (2018). 
12. The Communique from the fifth Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) 
(2017), issued on 16 October 2017, stated that: 
A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be 
operated and governed. This may consist of common goals, minimum or maximum 
standards, harmonisation, limits on action, or mutual recognition, depending on 
the policy area and the objectives being pursued. Frameworks may be 
implemented by legislation, by executive action, by memorandums of 
understanding, or by other means depending on the context in which the 
framework is intended to operate. 
It is therefore clear that there is already a significant degree of consensus as to 
what a common framework should look like. 
13. However, the principles described in the Communique do not address 
fundamental issues, such as the basis on which it will be decided that an 
approach will address UK or GB issues (and by inference, NI-only frameworks). 
Other omissions from the document are a definition of how the final content of 
common frameworks will be decided, or why it is envisaged that operation and 
governance arrangements might be expected to differ from one framework to 
another. It is not enough to say that “It will be the aim of all parties to agree where 
there is a need for common frameworks and the content of them”, without 
providing some definition of agreement and a mechanism to ensure that 
agreement is forthcoming where it has been agreed to be necessary. 
14. Although the Communique states that common frameworks may be implemented 
by legislation, it is silent on how this should be done; whether there should be a 
single UK Act, or whether each jurisdiction should enact compliant legislation, in 
line with its own legislative competence and taking account of particular local 
factors, to deliver a co-ordinated legislative framework across the United 
Kingdom. For example, agricultural markets and challenges are materially 
different across the UK jurisdictions. It has been argued that a one-size-fits-all 
common framework would reflect the needs of the largest population and ignore 
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the needs of the more marginal markets overseen by the Devolved 
Administrations.4 
15. Both the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations have many years’ 
experience of interaction with EU legislative processes and outputs that must be 
incorporated into domestic legislation. Whether or not you agree with the 
legislation itself, it is a fact that the process is effective in defining a common legal 
framework that Member States can appropriately transpose into their own 
domestic law. In the case of frameworks addressing UK-wide issues, it would 
make sense to adopt a modified EU legislative approach to defining legislation 
that must (or may) be enacted by the Devolved Administrations, in line with their 
own legislative framework. Expert legal opinion might provide insight as to 
whether this approach might also address constitutional aspects of the debate 
but, in a commercial context, adopting a minimum change approach is generally 
the least risky approach for effective delivery of change. 
Question 3: The interaction between frameworks and the negotiation of new 
international agreements including free trade deals 
16. For 45 years EU frameworks have constrained the legislative and executive 
discretion of UK governments; the design of 1999 devolution did not anticipate 
that this would ever change. Once outside the European Union, the UK 
Government wishes to negotiate free trade deals with other third-party countries, 
more advantageous to the United Kingdom than those that currently apply to the 
United Kingdom as an EU Member State. Three difficulties arise: 
a) there is uncertainty about whether the UK Government can retain Westminster 
approval for, and EU acceptance of, the Chequers Agreement (HM 
Government, 2018) 
b) there is a lack of clarity about whether Brexit will be followed by extensive 
elimination of the ‘wasteful regulation’ which one strand of Brexiter opinion 
                                            
4 ‘Liz Saville-Roberts MP (Plaid Cymru) said that developing common frameworks for the UK as a whole 
required mature co-operation between the national Governments of the UK. “It should not be a case of one 
country asset-stripping powers away from the others to impose a once-size-fits-all England-first framework 
across all the UK’s countries.” She also noted that Westminster will only be bound by political undertaking in 
the form of intergovernmental agreement, while the devolved Governments face legal constraints.’ (Senedd 
Research, 2018). 
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believes to be the great benefit of leaving the European Union: changes that 
would make free trade deals with certain countries much easier to negotiate 
but would provoke EU claims of economic and social dumping 
c) it is clear that the UK Government believes that the Devolved Administrations 
do not share its deregulatory instincts and would attempt to obstruct, because 
of substantive policy disagreement and for tactical motivations. 
Although the positions of the three Devolved Administrations might vary 
according to the issue, a high level of political tension between them and the UK 
Government can be expected unless measures are taken to overcome the lack 
of trust. 
Question 4: Funding of obligations and commitments arising from frameworks 
17. As noted in the later section on ‘Applicability to Scotland’s public finances’, the 
effects of Brexit will bring further complexities to the devolved financing system. 
There are three reasons for this: 
a) identical policies across the four UK nations do not result in the same levels of 
per capita expenditure owing to varying characteristics 
b) policies deemed to be equivalent will not necessarily have the same 
expenditure dynamics as identical policies 
c) historically these issues have been swept up under EU frameworks and 
financing, with a common UK interest to maximise receipts and thereby reduce 
the net contribution to the EU budget. 
18. The question arises as to how former EU-financed expenditure will be managed 
and funded in future, though the issue could be wider, depending on what 
common frameworks contain. Fiscal risks for Scotland and Wales are intensified 
by the increasing dependence of their budgets on revenues either raised or 
assigned, bringing greater year-on-year volatility than when most revenue came 
from the Barnett-controlled block grant within the context of UK Spending Review 
settlements.  
19. There is likely to be a tension between (a) the desire to maximise expenditure by 
contesting detail, and (b) protection of the block grant character of the funding 
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settlement. Technical options include (i) transferring exit-year expenditure5 into 
the block and then applying the Barnett formula, and (ii) classifying all ‘common 
frameworks’ expenditure as Annually Managed Expenditure, while treating such 
expenditure either as a mini-block with predetermined rules on switching or as a 
large number of specific grants. An outcome to guard against is giving financial 
levers to the UK Government, which could result in concealed micro-
management of devolved finances, thus negating one of the strengths of the 
1999 fiscal settlement. An issue for concern is that such expenditure is likely to 
attract more political and media attention than its absolute size merits, thereby 
adding to the widespread public misunderstanding of the devolved fiscal 
arrangements. 
Electricity as an Example of Common Framework Functioning 
20. The UK Government wishes to ensure that UK internal commerce will not be 
impeded by the imposition of different legal standards and/or obligations by the 
Devolved Administrations. The principle of establishing common frameworks to 
retain the necessary legal and regulatory alignment is accepted by all, including 
the Scottish Government. Being able to map the common framework concept to 
a familiar and proven operational setting will be helpful in defining how the new 
frameworks should be approached and governed. As these are intended to serve 
a similar policy-unifying function to EU regulations and directives, it would be 
logical to use the latter framework as a starting point to the definition and 
implementation of mandatory/outcome-based common frameworks. Indeed, the 
proposed Intergovernmental Agreement (Cabinet Office, 2018b)6 supports this 
perspective as it distinguishes between “specific elements of some areas” that 
will require legislation and other policy areas where other forms of agreement will 
suffice. 
                                            
5 The transfer could be of expenditure averaged over a number of years in those cases where there is significant 
year-on-year variability. 
6 “As of 24 April 2018, the UK Government and the Welsh Government have agreed to the terms of this IGA 
and Memorandum. The IGA and Memorandum remain open to the Scottish Government and a future Northern 
Ireland Executive” (Cabinet Office, 2018b, p. 1). 
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21. The issue underlying common frameworks is that of delivering desired policy co-
ordination while respecting devolved legislative competences. The intersection 
between the range of policy areas and the different devolved legislative 
competences has already been identified in the Frameworks Analysis (Cabinet 
Office 2018a) and the implementation of common frameworks must address this 
asymmetry in a rational manner, to avoid inconsistencies and uncertainty. 
However, previous experience in establishment of the Single Electricity Market 
(SEM) for the island of Ireland shows that a significant cross-jurisdictional market 
policy can be implemented by a subset of UK legislatures, even though the 
specific area of energy is not devolved in Scotland. 
22. The policy of creating a more efficient and secure electricity system for Ireland 
required agreement between two governments, with different constitutional and 
legal frameworks. It also impacted only Northern Ireland rather than the whole 
United Kingdom. The UK and Irish Governments implemented this policy through 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (HM Government, 2006), whereby they 
agreed to work together on the project and pass legislation to implement the 
agreed market framework. The MoU recognised the common framework of EU 
legislation within which the market would operate, ensuring future policy 
alignment between the two governments. Thus, a range of existing directives 
covering renewable generation, competition in generation and supply, 
environmental standards and consumer protection, that already ensured cross-
border policy alignment, could be drawn upon as the basis for the new cross-
border market. European Union membership provided assurance as to 
sustainability of the joint market, even in the significant market structural change 
introduced by the Third Energy Package of legislation (European Commission - 
Energy, undated). 
23. This Third Energy Package differs from requirements in earlier European energy 
legislation, as it uses EU regulations to obligate changes that must be 
implemented identically across all Member States, alongside EU directives that 
allow Member States discretion in implementing internal requirements. In 
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combination, the regulations and directives ensure alignment of policy and cross-
border arrangements that co-ordinate effectively. 
24. Experience over many years in both the SEM and the European single market 
more generally demonstrates that cross-jurisdictional common policy 
frameworks can operate successfully, without inhibiting trade, even where they 
have been implemented through different trading structures as a result of 
different legislative frameworks. There is no reason why a similar approach 
should not be applied to the implementation of agreed common policy 
frameworks in the post-Brexit environment with Holyrood retaining all its 
devolved competences and implementing these frameworks as it would 
previously have done with EU directives. 
25. As with the SEM, common frameworks could apply across all UK internal 
jurisdictions, but be implemented by the devolved legislatures. These 
frameworks could also be mobilised for specific purposes to support a wider 
policy goal across a subset of the Devolved Administrations. For policy areas 
identified as requiring legislation, these would function in a similar way to 
European regulations, in that they would have direct effect without ‘transposition’ 
into devolved legislation. For common frameworks of both types, the key to 
effectiveness and acceptance will be the process of development and 
governance of their operation; particularly as there are likely to be financial 
consequences arising from implementation. 
Wider Considerations concerning Scotland’s Public Finances 
26. Fiscal frameworks are outside the remit of this Inquiry, yet they are relevant to 
the issues under consideration. The nearest thing to a common fiscal framework 
has been successive issues of the Treasury’s (2015) Statement of Funding 
Policy. Although the asymmetry of UK fiscal devolution is a factor in the lack of a 
statutory basis for devolution finance, this is internationally unusual. Heald (2016) 
cautioned against assuming the resilience of the February 2016 fiscal framework 
for the Scottish Parliament, negotiated between the UK and Scottish 
Governments shortly before the Brexit Referendum (HM Government and 
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Scottish Government, 2016). The Cameron UK Government’s desire to ‘clear the 
decks’ worked to the advantage of the Scottish Government which reached an 
agreement about the Block Grant Adjustment that is more favourable than it 
might have been. The interim nature of the 2016 Fiscal Framework means that 
future negotiations are required in time for setting the Block Grant Adjustment 
from 2022-23 onwards; timing that is unfortunate in the context of Brexit. 
27. The post-devolution survival of the Barnett formula system is one of the 
surprising features of the first two decades of devolution. This has benefited 
Scotland in two ways: ensuring that there are rules-based procedures for 
upwards and downwards adjustments; and in providing some protection for the 
block-grant character of UK devolution finance. Nevertheless, UK devolution 
finance is deeply embedded in the Treasury’s processes for public expenditure 
management and control (Heald and McLeod, 2005), leading to more internal 
borders within the block7 and making it more difficult to manage and prioritise. 
Further complexity seems an inevitable consequence of the repatriation of EU-
financed expenditure, though the form that this takes will have important effects. 
Whereas in the past EU state-aid rules set a high threshold, there could be 
arguments about whether certain devolved taxes distort trade.  
Glasgow, 31 August 2018 
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